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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
NEGLIGENCE-RECOVERY DENIED WHERE PLAINTIFF WAS
EN VENTRE SA MERE
An infant plaintiff brought an action through his Guardian ad litem for
injuries allegedly sustained as a result of his mother's fall down a stairway in
defendant's multiple dwelling house while plaintiff was en ventre sa mere in the
ninth month of pregnancy. The Appellate Division affirmed the order of the
lower court dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Woods
v. Lancet,.278 App. Div. 913, 105 N. Y. S. 2d 417 (1st Dept. 1951).
The decision in the instant case reflects the majority rule-that, in the absence
of a statute, the child or its personal representative has no right of action for
prenatal injuries. Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 IlM. 359, 56 N. E. 638 (1890),
Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1884), Drobner v.
Peters, 232 N. Y. 220, 133 N. E. 567 (1921), Lipps v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. &
Light Co., 164 Wisc. 272, 159 N. W. 916 (1916). The courts have differed on
the grounds for denying recovery to the infant. The most common argument
which has been advanced in support of the majority position is that since the
unborn child is part of the mother, there is no separate person or human in esse at
the time of the accident. Dietrich v. Northampton, supra, Drobner v. Peters,
supra, Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, supra. Since one of the necessary elements
to a cause of action based on negligence is a duty to conform to a particular
standard of conduct toward another, the courts have repeatedly held that no duty
of care can exist to an unborn child because it has no independent existence.
Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights Ry. Co., 154 App. Div. 667, 139 N. Y. Supp. 367
(2nd Dept. 1913), app. dism'd without op. 209 N. Y. 515, 102 N. E. 1107
(1913), Lipps v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co., supra. The lack of prece-
dent permitting recovery for injuries sustained by a child ea ventre sa mere has
influenced many decisions. See Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124
Tex. 347,78 S. W. 2d 944 (1935), In Re Roberts Estate, 158 Misc. 698,286 N. Y.
Supp. 476 (Surr. Ct. 1936). Also a fear of opening the door to fictitious claims,
and the necessity of speculation as to the true cause of the child's injury have been
offered as a rationale for denying recovery. Newman v. Detroit, 281 Mich. 60,
274 N. W. 710 (1937), Magnolia Co.ca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, supra.
As early as 1900 in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, supra, Justice Boggs based
his dissenting opinion on the findings of medical science that the fetus was capable
of an independent and separate life at a period in advance of birth. Recently some
courts have adopted this liberal and realistic approach to the problem. In allowing
recovery to the infant, these courts have distinguished between a viable child which
is capable of an independent existence and a child which has not reached that
stage of development See page 1605 American Illustrated Medical Dictionary
(19th ed.), Bobrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D. C. 1946), Damasiewicz et al v.
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Gorsuch et al, - Md. -, 79 A. 2d 550 (1951), Verkennes v. Corniea, 229
Minn. 365, 38 N. W. 2d 838 (1949), Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit Inc.,
152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N. B. 2d 334 (1949). These jurisdictions now recognize a
duty of care owing to a viable child since it is an independent person.
Since Drobner v. Peters, supra, the doctrine of stare decisis has been adhered
to in New York as the basis for denying a cause of action for injuries sustained by
an unborn child. In re Roberts' Estate, supra. See Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights
Ry. Co., supra, denying recovery on a contract theory. The New York Courts regard
the unborn child as a part of the mother for purposes of negligence, and therefore
no duty of care extends to an infant en ventre sa mere. The majority opinion in
Drobner v. Peters, supra, recognized that in New York in respect to property
rights, the life of an infant begins at the moment of conception. Marsellis v. Thal-
himer, 2 Paige 35, 21 Am. Dec. 66 (N. Y. 1830), Wright v. Miller, 8 N. Y. 9,
59 Am. Dec. 438 (1853); also see: Quinlen v. Welch, 69 Hun. 584, 23 N. Y.
Supp. 963 aff d. 141 N. Y. 158, 36 N. E. 12 (1894). However, the courts feel
justified in recognizing property rights in an unborn child, while refusing to allow
recovery for wrongful injuries inflicted on the infant in utero, because no problem
arises as to any duty of personal care existing to the property owner, whereas in
the tort situation, it is difficult to find any duty of care owing to an unborn infant
which has no legal personality. In the realm of criminal law, the New York Penal
Code imputes a legal personality to an unborn child in that it is manslaughter 1st
degree to wilfully kill the child after it is able to stir in the womb by any injury
inflicted upon the mother, N. Y. Penal Law §1050, and the mother herself may be
guilty of a crime if she intentionally causes the death of "the quick child whereof
she is pregnant," N. Y. Penal Law §1052. Even though the unborn child is treated
as a separate entity in the criminal law, the courts fail to extend tort liability on
the grounds that the crime causing the death of the infant does not imply liability
to the child for personal injuries.
It is a recognized medical fact that the age of viability is usually seven months.
Herzog, Medical Jurisprudence §860-975 (1931), 2 Taylor's Principles & Practice
of Medical Jurisprudence (10th ed.). Since the plaintiff in the instant case was en
ventre sa mere in the ninth month of his mother's pregnancy when the alleged
injuries were sustained by him, he had reached the final stage of fetal development
and was capable of surviving outside the womb. Where the child is viable, the law
should recognize its independent personality and the resultant duty of care. If the
New York Courts feel bound by stare decisis, it is believed desirable that the Legis-
lature should take action in this area.
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